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Abstract: We derive and estimate an econometric model of export versus foreign 
production using firm-level data on foreign activities of German multinationals. 
Proximity-concentration theory which we derive our model from shows that firms face 
a trade-off between concentrating their production at home to save on plant set-up costs 
and producing abroad to save on distance costs. Firms facing this trade-off choose 
between export and foreign production according to their expected profits. The model is 
brought to the data using a pooled-probit analysis over the period 1996-1999. We find 
support for the proximity-concentration trade-off. In particular, market size and distance 
affect positively the probability of foreign production whereas fixed costs have a 
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1. Introduction 
 
Globalization has been driven by multinational firms. They acquire affiliates abroad, 
shift production to gain market access and to take advantage of international cost 
differentials. This has caught attention in political debate and academic research. 
Understanding the driving forces and motives of internationalization of firms’ activities 
is a precondition to assessing its effects on welfare and labor markets. Economic theory 
has advanced various theories of the emergence of multinational firms, which are 
mostly complementary in explaining different subgroups of the heterogeneous group 
subsumed under the heading multinational firm. 
We derive an econometric model and estimated using firm-level data from one of 
these theories: the proximity-concentration theory. It explains activities between 
developed countries quite well (Brainard 1997, Buch et al. (2005), Carr et al. 2001, 
Ekholm (1998)). In particular, it can explain bi-directional intra-industry activities 
which account for a high share of developed country activities.  
So far, the empirical literature related to the proximity-concentration trade-off relies 
on aggregated data (Brainard 1997, Carr et al. 2001). That can be justified by the fact 
that symmetry among firms is often assumed in general equilibrium models. With 
symmetric firms, statements about the average firm can be made. Some of these 
hypotheses can also be analyzed using aggregate data. Nevertheless, the theory is 
microeconomic by nature. The fundamental decision that proximity-concentration 
theory analyzes is the discrete choice of each firm between exporting and producing 
abroad. Using aggregated data, this decision cannot be examined. We, therefore, use 
firm-level data to estimate a structural model that provides microeconomic foundations 
for the decision between exporting and producing abroad. Although this decision is   3
central in proximity-concentration theory, to our knowledge, it has never been estimated 
directly. 
The paper falls into six main sections. In the following section, we restate a stylized 
version of the proximity-concentration model of export versus production abroad. 
Thereby, we focus explicitly on the decision taken by the firm. We present our 
estimation strategy in section three by explaining how we bring this model to the data. 
In section four, we give detailed information on the firm-level database. We present the 
empirical estimates in section five. They support the proximity-concentration theory. 
We summarize and conclude in section six. 
2. A stylized model of the exports versus affiliate production 
Proximity-concentration theory analyzes the decision of firms on how to serve the 
foreign market. Firms can export on an arm-length basis or establish an affiliate and 
produce abroad. Exporters incur distance costs, which increase variable costs and 
therefore the price of goods sold in the foreign country. Producing abroad is cheaper 
than exporting with respect to variable costs because no distance costs arises. However, 
producing abroad is bound to additional fixed costs because a second plant is necessary. 
Firms face a proximity-concentration trade-off (Brainard, 1997). Proximity to the 
customers abroad saves distance costs while concentration of production (at home) and 
exporting saves additional fixed costs. Firms chose between the two alternatives to 
serve the foreign market by comparing the associated profits. The result of the 
comparison is revealed by the way a firm serves foreign market.  
The model derived in this section is a stylized version of the proximity-concentration 
model a la Brainard (1993). We assume a two-country, two-sector one-factor general-
equilibrium model, which explains companies’ internationalization strategies. The only   4
factor of production is labor. All individuals are identical in offering one unit of labor. 
There are two sectors: (i) a perfect-competition sector producing a homogenous good 
and (ii) a monopolistic-competition sector producing differentiated goods. The 
production process in the differentiated-goods’ sector is assumed to give rise to fixed 
costs at the company level (to generate the ownership advantage) and fixed costs at the 
plant level (to produce the good). Consumers are assumed to love variety. They choose 
from a bundle of different varieties, which are symmetric in the sense that the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) is the same for any two varieties. In the aggregate, their 
decisions are reflected in those of the representative consumer who buys an average 
amount of each variety depending on its price. 
Markets are segmented by distance costs. Exported differentiated goods are subject to 
these distance costs and sell, therefore, for a higher price abroad than at home. Distance 
costs might include costs of information, transport, communication and doing business 
in a foreign environment. Distance costs in the model take Samuelson’s “iceberg” form: 
a fraction of a good-shipped melts away in transit. Production abroad is not subject to 
distance costs, thus the level of distance costs abroad affects relative profitability of 
exporting and producing. For high distance cost levels, producing abroad is the more 
profitable strategy, because high distance cost make exports very expensive relative to 
production abroad, which is unaffected by distance costs. The corresponding export 
sales are rather low. For low distance costs, in contrast, exporting is the more profitable 
strategy to supply the foreign market. Variable distance costs increase the price of the 
exported good only to a small extent relative to the additional fixed costs which must be 
paid to make production abroad possible. 
Equilibrium in this model requires that the utility of the representative consumer is 
maximized, that all goods and the factor market are cleared in both countries, that the   5
current account is balanced and that the firms’ profits Π in both countries are 
maximized. Maximization of firms’ profits implies that no firm can increase its profit 
by changing the strategy to supply the foreign market, i.e. to switch from exporting to 
producing abroad or vices versa. To this end, the firms compare profits of different 
strategies. Equation (1) gives the comparison of firm i: 
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The superscripts M and N stand for multinational and national firms. The subscripts H 
and F denote home and foreign as location of production. Prices of goods are denoted 
by p, quantities sold by q, and marginal cost by c. The first term on the right hand side 
gives the profit that a multinational firm makes in its home market (net of fixed costs), 
the second term its profits in the foreign market (net of fixed costs). The third term 
gives the profits that the (national) firm realizes at home and abroad when exporting 
(net of fixed costs). The forth term, Fi,F, denotes the fixed costs which incur if firm i 
employs an additional plant to produce in the foreign country F. Fixed costs other than 
Fi,F disappear when differencing. In the following, we call profits net of fixed costs 
variable profits. 
Equation (1) displays the fundamental decision of the firm in the proximity-
concentration theory: it depends on whether it is more profitable to produce abroad or to 
export. It is straightforward to see that lower fixed costs at the plant level, Fi,F, increase 
the likeliness of setting-up a plant abroad. The other effects are harder to come by. 
Remember, that optimal pricing in monopolistic competition models always involves a 
fixed markup over marginal costs. This markup is given by the reciprocal of the degree 
of differentiation between varieties, which arises from the utility function and shall be 
denoted by ρ. Pricing is therefore only dependent on the degree of differentiation and on   6
the marginal costs, c. Both are assumed to be the same for all firms. Hence, all firms 
charge the same price in equilibrium.  
However, the prices perceived by consumers are higher for exported goods because 
consumers incur the distance costs. Per unit distance cost are not incurred for goods of a 
foreign affiliate, in contrast. Prices of goods produced abroad are the same as prices of 
domestic goods in the foreign country. Consequently, consumers in the foreign country 
substitute domestic goods and goods produced by foreign affiliates of multinational 
firms for imported goods, because of the higher price for imports. The quantities sold in 
the foreign market are thus lower for exporting firms than for multinational firms 
producing abroad. How much lower depends on the level of distance costs and the 
degree of differentiation. Quantities sold in the home market are the same for all firms. 
The distance costs within a country are zero, because we assume distance costs to apply 
only to sales in the foreign market. 
Thus, the internationalization decision depends only on the profits earned in the 
foreign market since prices, quantities and markups, and therefore profits, of national 
and multinational companies at home are the same. Foreign profits, in contrast, differ 
because exports are subject to distance costs and quantities exported qi,F
Ex are smaller 
than quantities qi,F
M sold by a foreign affiliate. The quantity qi,F
k (k=M, N)consumers 
demand of a good depends on its price pi,F
k, on the price index in the foreign market PF, 
on the degree of differentiation ρ and on the market size YF. Furthermore, production 
abroad incurs additional fixed costs. Rewriting the profit comparison (1) in terms of the 
different costs and taking into account that only export markets matter for relative 
profits yields 
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Variable costs are given by ci,j with j=H,F. If Πi is smaller than zero, firm i prefers to 
export its goods. If Πi is larger than zero, it decides to establish an affiliate in the host 
country. The decision depends on the price pi,F and the quantity qi,F sold in the foreign 
market under the different regimes, the variable costs ci, and the fixed costs Fi,F. The 
quantity qi,F which is sold in the foreign market depends on the market share that a 
company can capture. This is a function of its own price pi, the foreign market’s price 
index PF and the total size of the market YF. 
3. Estimation strategy 
Although not stated explicitly, proximity-concentration theory is best suited to explain 
the foreign activities of firms in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, it seems not to be 
applicable so well to firms in the service sector. We therefore focus on parent firms, 
which are classified as being active in a manufacturing industry. From our database of 
foreign affiliates of German multinational firms we eliminate all parent firms which are 
classified as service firms and their affiliates. 
Proximity-concentration theory predicts systematic differences between exporting 
firms and multinational firms, which produce abroad. In order to analyze the systematic 
differences we need to distinguish the two groups. Our database covers the whole 
population of German firms’ foreign affiliates. The affiliates and the parent firms are 
classified according to the sector they are engaged in. Thus, although we do not have 
information about exports at the firm level we can infer this information from our data 
base. We can distinguish an exporting firm from a firm producing abroad by the sectoral 
classification of its foreign affiliate. For our analysis, we define an exporting firm as a   8
parent firm classified in manufacturing that has affiliates active only in the wholesale 
sector of a particular country. We define a firm as producing abroad if the 
manufacturing parent firm holds affiliates that are active in manufacturing. 
Descriptive analysis reveals that the affiliates of manufacturing multinational firms 
are strongly concentrated in the same sector as the parent firm and in the wholesale 
sector. We add the sales of wholesale affiliates of firms without production units in a 
particular market to our export variable. These exports are not identical with exports 
published in official statistics but have the advantage of being calculated from firms 
which actually face the decision of exporting or producing abroad. The selection bias in 
our database affects both groups exporters and firms producing abroad in the same way. 
In our multi-country multi-sector database, a particular parent company may export in 
one country and produce abroad in another one. 
Having classified the firms in those which export and those which produce abroad, 
we analyze systematic differences between both groups using a probit model. The 
equation to estimate is given by equation (2), i.e. the comparison of the variable profits 
gained by exporting πi
N and by producing abroad πi
M, keeping in mind the additional 
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If Πi is larger than zero, producing abroad is more profitable than exporting for firm i. 
If Πi is smaller than zero, the firm will export its goods to serve the foreign market, 
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i i π π φ ≡  and express profits as a 
fraction of sales. In monopolistic competition, the fixed mark-up over variable costs 1/ρ 




distance costs τ and the mark-up ρ, and output qi is a function of the former three and 
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Where τ stands for the distance costs, and Pjk for the price index in the industry j in 
the foreign country k. The market size of industry j in country k is given by µjYk. 
Departing from our model, which assumes a CES utility function, we will allow the 
market size to have a different effects on profits of exporting firms and firms producing 
abroad in our empirical analysis. With changing market size, models that use CES 
utility functions yield an adjustment to the new equilibrium only through a change in the 
number of firms but not through the size of a foreign affiliate. This feature which stems 
from the utility function seems to be a strong abstraction. Empirical evidence points out 
that adjustment in changing market size has both channels: the entry and the size 
adjustment of existing firms (Buch et al. 2005). We therefore allow market size to have 
different effects on the profits of firms which produce abroad than on the profits of 
exporting firms by introducing the parameter γ that expresses the different effect of 
market size on firms’ profits. We assume γ  to be positive. The market size has a   10
different effect on exporting firms and firms producing abroad if γ is different from one. 








































Since the degree of differentiation is the same for all firms, it cancels in the above 
expression of the relative profit of exporting. Certainly, the degree of differentiation 
differs between firms, and the differences systematically affect the profits of the firms 
and the profit comparison between the two modes of supplying the foreign market. Yet, 
we stick to the assumption of the same degree of differentiation for all goods from the 
theoretical model because we do not have any information on goods produced or 
exported by firms. We can therefore not say anything about their degree of 
differentiation. Since in model of monopolistic competition firms are assumed to be too 





























We estimate a log-linearized version of equation (4’’). Thus, log linearizing gives 
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We define the left hand side of equation (3’) as  ( )
M
i i i F π ψ − ≡1 . After taking logs, 
we have a non-linear term, which is some function of plant level fixed costs scaled by 
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The log-linearized version of equation (3’) is given in (7) 
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If the proximity-concentration model holds, we can infer whether Πi is larger zero by 
observing the existence of a foreign affiliate which is active in manufacturing. If no 
affiliate in manufacturing exists, the firm revealed that exporting is more profitable, i.e. 
Πi smaller zero. Thus, for any firm we observe the strategy chosen and define the 
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Bringing ψi to the other side and defining the difference positively, the decision I 
with I=0 for exporting firms and I=1 for firms producing abroad is given by 
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π
µ β τ β β 1 ln ln ln ln 3 2 1 . (7) 
Where β1=ρ/(1-ρ), β2= 1/(1-ρ), and β3=(γ-1). We cannot observe the marginal costs 
of exporting firms and foreign affiliates. We use sectoral wages in Germany and in the 
foreign country as proxies for marginal costs. The log of geographic distance between 
Germany and the partner country is used to proxy distance costs τ. We use the output of 
sector j in the foreign country k as variable for market sizejk.  
The last term in (7) is difficult to implement in our econometric analysis. If as 
assumed in the theoretical model, fixed costs have to be covered by per-period profits it 
is hard to measure how many years in real time make one period. Moreover, we decided 
to use sales as scaling factor rather than profits. In theory that does not change the   12
results because profits are a fixed share of sales. Regarding our data, we believe that 
sales are less sensitive to accounting standards, profit transfers and other effects which 
are not related to our export versus production abroad decision. We, therefore, proxy the 




i i q p F ln 4 0 β β +  and expect β4 to be negative. Substituting into (7), 
and adding the error term we obtain the empirical model: 
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. (8) 
wj
Ger denotes wages in sector j in Germany,  wj
Foreign denotes wages in sector j in the 
foreign country. DC denotes the distance costs. F denotes the fixed costs of the affiliate 
of firms i in industry j in country k which are scaled by the sales of the foreign affiliate. 
uijk is the error term. 
The probit model we propose here relies crucially on the assumption of 
homoskedasticity in the underlying latent variable model. We use the Huber-White 
method to correct for heteroscedasticity. Because the data are pooled over five years, 
from 1996 to 2000, we include time dummy variables and correct for serial-correlation 
following Wooldridge (2002). Finally, because the model is non-linear in its 
parameters, the marginal effects are not constant and must be interpreted at some 
sample point. We choose the means of the independent variables for this evaluation. 
Before we present and interpret the result, however, we first describe the data.    13
4. The data 
We use a new and comprehensive data base on the foreign activities of German firms 
at the individual level of the foreign affiliate
1. The data base contains information on all 
foreign affiliates of German multinational firms. Among the characteristics is the 
sectoral classification of affiliate and parent firm. We use this information to construct 
our discrete dependent variable, which is set to one if a foreign affiliate of a particular 
German firm is classified in a manufacturing sector. Our object of analysis is the 
German parent firm. Thus, a firm that holds more than one foreign affiliate in one sector 
of a foreign country is counted only once. 
Our discrete dependent variable is set to zero if the foreign affiliate is classified in 
wholesale. We use the wholesale classification of an affiliate as proxy for exports of the 
parent firm, because our database does not contain information on exports. We believe 
that our proxy reflects accurately that a firm engages in exporting activities, because we 
included only parent firms from the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, we only 
classified firms as exporting (compared to producing abroad) if a firm has only a 
wholesale affiliate in a particular country. Firms that have established a wholesale and a 
production affiliate in a particular country are classified as producing abroad.  
Proximity-concentration theory explains the emergence of horizontal multinational 
firms. These are firms, which engage in the same activities at home and abroad. From 
an empirical point of view, production units active at home and abroad must be 
classified in the same industry. We use two levels of aggregation, the two- and -three-
digit NACE level, to get the information whether the multinational is a ‘pure’ horizontal 
firm. Moreover, we use three samples to estimate our model. The first one uses the   14
information with all manufacturing firms’ affiliates. Both the second and the third one 
uses the sub-samples with horizontal firms only, in its wide (2-digit NACE) version and 
in its narrow (3-digit NACE) classification. Our 2-digit NACE classification sample 
distinguishes 16 non-service sector, the 3-digit NACE classification 74 non-service 
sectors. 
In addition, we use our micro-level database to calculate the fixed costs at the plant 
level. When comparing profits, firms must consider the additional fixed costs at the 
plant level when producing abroad. Our database “International Capital Links” contains 
information on fixed assets (Sachanlagen) at the level of affiliates in manufacturing 
sectors. We cannot use these fixed costs directly, because we cannot know the potential 
fixed costs of firms that decide to serve the foreign market through exports. Thus, we 
calculate expected fixed costs for each sector in each country. We use the sectoral 
average of the fixed assets for each country and scale this variable by the average 
sectoral sales of foreign affiliates of German multinational firms in this country. We 
believe that this variable is a good proxy for the ex-ante expectations over the fixed 
costs of the production unit, which might be established. We use this variable in non-
logarithmic form because the fixed costs are scaled already by the sales.  
Two other exogenous variables, wages and market size are also available on sectoral 
level. Both are taken from the OECD STAN database and classified according to 
NACE. We use the sectoral output in a country to proxy market size. Certainly, 
absorption would be more appropriate, but incomplete sectoral trade data in STAN let 
us refrain from using absorption. Wages and output are deflated and converted into US$ 
at 1995 prices using the 1995 purchasing power parity. We use them in logarithmic 
                                                                                                                                               
1 See Lipponer (2002) for a detailed description of the data and the definition of FDI underlying German 
statistics   15
form in the regression analysis. The log of the wage of a partner country is subtracted 
from the log of the German wage in the particular sector. This gives us an explanatory 
variable, which might also take negative values. 
The last explanatory variable is distance costs, DC. We proxy distance costs by 
geographical distance. Thus, we have information only at the country level. Distance is 
taken from CEPII (2004). The geodesic distances are calculated following the great 
circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities or 
agglomerations (in terms of population). 
Lacking firm-level data for explanatory variables, we explain our firm decision to 
export or to produce abroad using sectoral data and the bilateral distance between 
Germany and the partner country. We therefore match our discrete dependent variable 
at the level of the firm to a set of sectoral exogenous variable at the NACE 2-digit level 
to estimate equation (8). 
Although we have, in principle, information on the foreign activities of German firms 
in more than 200 host countries, we lack information on some important explanatory 
variables for quite a few of these countries, mostly overseas countries or low-income 
countries. Therefore, the effective sample size is restricted to 52 countries, including a 
large number of developing countries and emerging markets. For some of the countries 
we could not obtain information about all manufacturing sectors. The information that 
we lose is quite substantial in terms of the absolute number of observations, the 
unconsidered countries account for about 36% of the number of foreign affiliates of 
German multinational firms and 41% of the sales. We believe that this does not bias our 
results because the summary statistics of the full and of the used sample look very 
similar (Table A).   16
Our sample includes 29752 observations. These are German multinational firms from 
a particular sector being active through a foreign affiliate in a manufacturing sector or in 
the wholesale sector in a foreign country. We pool data for the five-year period from 
1996 to 2000. A particular combination of a parent firm’s sector and a foreign country 
can appear several times even for the same year because more than one German firms 
from a particular sector engages in a particular foreign country. Thus, we have much 
more observations than the 3900 different combinations of 52 foreign countries and 15 
parent firm sectors over five years. The observations in our sample split into 14485 
affiliates active in a manufacturing sector and 15267 affiliates active in wholesale. In 
our sample, there are 2533 observations of parent firms that hold a manufacturing and a 
wholesale affiliate in one country. As stated above, we count them as firms producing 
abroad. 
5. Results 
We estimate equation (8) using a probit robust estimation, which assumed that 
observations are independent across groups but not necessarily independent within 
groups. As our data sample includes affiliates from different parent companies that are 
active in different sectors in different countries, we have quite a lot of heterogeneity in 
our data. The group structure implies fewer restrictions on the data. We choose the 
sector of the affiliate in the foreign country as the criteria to cluster the data. 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
Table 1 presents the estimates of the marginal effects of the full sample. In the first 
regression, we include sector and time dummy variables which control for some 
unobserved determinants. The second regression also includes country dummies. 
Including country dummies strongly affects the results because most variation in our   17
explanatory variables, wage difference,  distance costs and market size stems from 
differences between countries. Market size is significant when controlling for country 
differences whereas wage difference becomes insignificant. The fixed-cost share which 
is calculated as a sectoral average over all countries is unaffected by inclusion of 
country dummies in the regression. 
All coefficients in both regressions have the expected sign. The coefficient for the 
relative (wage) costs, β1, is positive. In the first regression it is significant at the 1% 
level of significance. In the second regression, the country dummy captures this effect. 
A positive coefficient of the wage difference (w
Ger–w
Foreign) indicates higher probability 
of producing abroad, the lower the wage in this country. Not surprisingly, lower costs 
are a driving force of the internationalization of production. Production in foreign 
affiliates is more likely in locations with low labor cost. The location where an affiliate 
is active must have a strong advantage over the home country. 
Turning to the coefficient of the distance-costs variable, β2, it is positive as well. High 
distance costs increase the probability that a firm decides in favor of producing abroad. 
Firms prefer exports over production abroad in markets close by. That is one element of 
the fundamental trade-off modeled in the proximity-concentration literature (Brainard 
1993, Markusen and Venables 1998, Markusen 2002). According to this literature, 
exports give rise to distance costs while production abroad makes an additional plant 
necessary.  
The negative effect of higher costs for an additional plant in the foreign country on 
production abroad is robust in all specifications. The coefficient of the fixed costs, β4 is 
negative and significant on the five-percent level. Higher fixed costs of the additional 
plant in the foreign country reduce the probability that a production unit is set up 
abroad. Instead, production is concentrated in existing plants and goods are exported to   18
foreign markets. Thus, our analysis also supports the second effect singled out by the 
proximity-concentration literature. Both variables, distance-costs and fixed-costs, have 
the expected sign and are significant and robust to the inclusion of the country dummy. 
The coefficient for market size, β3, is positive, although small. The small effect is in 
accordance with general equilibrium models of MNEs and trade, which use a CES 
utility function and assume an infinite number of firms. This implies that the market 
size effect is zero. In fact, differences in market size affect the number of firms in each 
market but do not affect the decision between export and production abroad. In our 
empirical analysis, we find that larger markets increase the probability of producing 
abroad. The effect is however quantitatively small.  
We use our estimates of the coefficients β1 and β2 to compute the structural parameter 
ρ. The (average) degree of differentiation among the products of the firms ρ is one of 
the structural parameters of the proximity-concentration model ρ determines firms’ 
mark-up. Since β1 is given by β1=ρ/(1-ρ) and β2 by β2= 1/(1-ρ), we can solve for it by 
dividing β1 by β2. For our estimates β1=0.0438 and β2=0.056, the computed ρ equals 
0.78. Homogeneous goods have a degree of differentiation of one that translates into an 
elasticity of substitution, which approaches infinity. A low ρ represents a low degree of 
substitution and a high degree of differentiation. Our result of ρ=0.78 is in the range 
used in theoretical models at the lower end. According to our estimation, the degree of 
differentiation is quite large. That is the result of our heterogeneous sample, which 
includes foreign affiliates in various countries and all industries in the manufacturing 
sector. 
We have classified 2533 observations of firms that have an affiliate in a 
manufacturing sector and in wholesale in a particular country as producing abroad. We   19
have done so, assuming that in these cases wholesale units abroad sell the product 
produced by the manufacturing affiliate abroad. However, it might also be possible, that 
the firms that hold a wholesale and a production unit in a particular country are 
exporting firms and the value added of the manufacturing affiliate is of minor 
importance. Thus, as a robustness check we drop the 2533 observations. The results of 
the probit regression explaining the decision of German parent firms to produce abroad 
based on the smaller sample are given in the second column of Table 2. 
Column three and four show the results for pure horizontal firms in the sense that the 
affiliate and the parent firm are classified in the same sector. Since the theoretical model 
applies only to horizontal firms, we rerun our regression for a smaller sample excluding 
all cases where affiliates and parents companies have different sectoral classification. 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
Our explanatory variables wage difference and fixed costs share are robust to the 
changes in the sample. That is not surprising give the small sample variation. Yet, the 
small change in the number of observations is an interesting result in its own right. 
Firstly, dropping non-horizontal firms (according to our definition) reduces the sample 
by 5.3% of all observations using the wide classification and by 7.1% of all 
observations using the narrow classification. Thus, the large majority of all affiliates in 
manufacturing are horizontal firms. Using aggregated data and different estimation 
strategies and techniques, several studies find also this result using different home 
countries (Carr et al. 2001, Blonigen et al. 2003, Braconier et al. 2002, Buch et al. 
2005). 
Secondly, only 8.5% of the firms in our sample have a manufacturing affiliate and a 
wholesale affiliate in a foreign market. Firms do either export (have a wholesale affiliate   20
and no affiliate in manufacturing) in a foreign country (15267 cases) or produce abroad 
(hold an affiliate in manufacturing and no wholesale affiliate) in a foreign country 
(11952 cases). This observation demonstrates that firms actually face the decision to 
exports  or to produce abroad. Wholesale affiliates held in addition to affiliates in 
manufacturing sector may either be set up to sell in the foreign market the goods 
produced abroad or to sell different products of the parent firm in this country.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyses manufacturers’ decision to serve foreign markets. We present a 
simple proximity-concentration model which allow us to derive several hypothesis to be 
tested. In particular, exports raise the price of goods sold in the foreign countries by 
distance costs while producing abroad requires additional fixed costs for the new plant. 
The model also predicts that large difference between costs of producing abroad and at 
home fosters internationalization of production. Finally, a small departure from the 
theory allows to test whether the size of the foreign market affects the firm’s decision 
how to serve the foreign market. 
The model is estimated using firm-level data that allows distinguishing between firms 
that serve the foreign market through exports and those that produce abroad. we use 
data for 15 non-service sectors in 52 countries over 6 years. By using the sectoral 
classification of foreign affiliates of German multinational firms, we construct a discrete 
dependent variable that takes the value one if a firm produces abroad and zero if it 
exports. The choice between the two strategies is explained by wage differences 
between Germany and the partner country, by distance, by the size of the foreign market 
and by the fixed costs for the additional plant if the firm produces abroad.    21
We find strong evidence for the proximity-concentration trade-off. We find market 
size to positively influence the internationalization decision of German firms. However, 
The effect remains low and is not robust to all specifications. In addition, fixed plant 
set-up costs decrease the incentive to engage in production abroad while distance costs 
increase the incentive to produce abroad. This result is robust across different 
specifications and different sub-samples. Sectoral wage differences have a positive 
effect on the probability to produce abroad, i.e. lower costs abroad increase the 
incentive to produce abroad.   22
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Table 1: Marginal effects of probit regression using the whole sample (Pooled probit 
analysis 1996–2000) 











Fixed Costs Share 
(–2.40) (–2.19) 
Sectoral Dummy Variables  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy Variables  No  Yes 
Time Dummy Variables  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  29752  29752 
Log-Likelihood -19505  -18496 
Robust z-values into Brackets. * Significantly different from 0 at 10-percent 
level. ** Significantly different from 0 at 5-percent level. *** Significantly 
different from 0 at 1-percent level. 
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Table 2: Robustness check: Marginal effects of probit regressions using variations of 
the sample (Pooled probit analysis 1996–2000) 
Production Abroad 
Without Wolesale and 
Poduction in a Foreign 
Country 
Horizontal MNEs only 
(wide classification) 






























Sectoral Dummy Variable  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy Variable  No  No  No 
Time Dummy Variable  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  27219  28161  27650 
Log-likelihood -18012  -18270  -17812 
Robust z-values into Brackets. * Significantly different from 0 at 10-percent level. ** Significantly different 
from 0 at 5-percent level. *** Significantly different from 0 at 1-percent level. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Summary Statistics 
  Original sample  Used sample 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. dev. 
Aff.  sales  50435 53889.95 137603.1 29752 56522.78 130775.8
Wage  34036 10639.44 20546.72 29752 11321.85 21001.65
Distance  51385 3330.40 3809.14 29752 2847.21 3668.74
Sectoral  output  33925 70703.92 136113.4 29752 73478.14 134308.0
Fixed cost share  50435  63.74 26.23 29752 60.54  20.79
Number of affiliates   51547                        
(100%) 




26087                        
(50.61%) 




25460                        
(49.39%) 
15267                        
(51.31%) 
 